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Dynastic Chinese History: Final Exam Questions

Dynastic Chinese History: Final Exam Questions


Understanding of Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) and Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours)

Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours), as a philosophy of life developed by Confucius, stresses the appropriate relationships within society (e.g. father and son, subject and ruler). Generally rooted in Chinese culture and nurtured by Confucius and Confucians, a distinguishing school of Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) began with Confucius who played a key role in the development of the tradition that originated long before his time. In terms of religions, Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) in not a religion, per se, but is a philosophy of hierarchy (Ebrey 9, 14-5) structured social order with the Emperor as the supreme authority of power. Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) (Ebrey 792-3) (Imperial Tours), based on the teachings of Confucius, emphasizes love for humanity with great value given to learning and to devotion to family (including ancestors), peace, and justice which greatly influenced the traditional culture of China.

Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) -also referenced as Taoism in many texts- as a philosophy of life founded by Laozi is a system of religion in China that draws upon nature as its guide. The religion's original term was used to describe regional beliefs, which eventually absorbed the beliefs of many competing sects and doctrines of ancient China. In terms of nature, Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) stresses the need for alignment with Dao (meaning "the way") or a cosmic force. The philosophical system of Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) advocates a simple and honest life, requiring noninterference with the course of natural events. The religion is deep rooted in metaphysical understandings of the Chinese character Dao (Tao) of which encompasses the whole processes of the Universe. Daoists are listed as one of the Six Schools: Yin-Yang, Confucian, Mohist, Legalist, School of Names, and Daoists.

Masters of Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) did not classify their practices, per se, but relied on the forces of reality, whereby working to increase their longevity. The masters believed these forces of reality provided the ability to interact with such realities not apparent to the normal way of seeing things. Furthermore, life was ruled by moral virtue. Masters offered philosophical adages (some recognize this term as "ancient Chinese philosophy") as guide for life, thinking and actions, while also practicing meditation and physical exercises, studying nature for diet and remedy, and practicing rituals related to their view that reality had many layers and forms for human interaction.


Fundamental Differences between Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) and Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours)

Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) shares some similarities with classical Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) (e.g. self-cultivation and concern for the concrete details of life rather than on abstractions and ideals) but simultaneously represents an alternate and critical tradition contradictory to that of Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours). Based on the thoughts of Confucius, Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) works toward changing the world through the lives of Confucians who are required to be practical in setting making life "right". Unlike Daoists who believe that they should not interfere with life and life's circumstances, Confucians have a hand in everything. For example, Daoists stay as they are while Confucians work toward change for the better –life is a quest for improvement.

Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) is based on the premise that one can alter reality; that life can be understood, reality can be named and controlled. Contrary to this premise, Daoists believe such "interference" is derivative of an individual's frustration with life and division among people. They believe Confucians place a barrier between humans and nature that weakens and ultimately destroys the harmony in life. In a fundamental nature, Daoists believe that humans bring about their own troubles through morality (good versus bad) and aesthetics (beauty versus ugly). Daoists must not live life according to human-made distinctions but to allow Dao to enact events naturally (e.g. Dao works out the knots of life, blunting the sharp edges of relationships and problems, and turning down the light on painful occurrences) avoiding upsetting the natural flow of harmony.

Comparing both philosophies, combined with additional consideration of the impact each belief had on the people, Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) has had more influence on Chinese society. Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours), as a complex system of moral, social, political, and religious thought, has had a tremendous influence on the history of Chinese civilization even in today’s world, which has often been viewed by many as the "state religion" of imperial China.

Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) was at its height in China during the Han dynasty (200 BC - 200 AD), during which time Confucius was almost revered as a God and his teachings widely propagated, lacked being labeled a religion due to its lack of focus on the metaphysical. Instead, it was an influential social philosophy. This was a befitting label since Confucius worked to legitimize and promote an autocratic social structure. In fact, many Emperors relied upon Confucian scholars for administrative assistance in governing their empires.

Rulers were enticed by the Confucianist society as self-regulating. Under Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours), citizens were required to act in agreement with a pre-established pattern of behavior, thereby making the need for legal enforcement for social misbehavior and actions unnecessary. Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) greatly influenced the development of Chinese social thought in the realm of social thought.

Unlike Confucius who wanted to improve the morality of a progressive society, Lao Zi aimed to enlighten the individual through regressive beliefs, whereby the two philosophies conflicted. Since Lao Zi conceived of the Dao above all distinctions of good and evil, he concluded that the Confucian values of human-heartedness and righteousness degraded these higher principles. Concerning this very premise, Lao Zi wrote:
"When the Dao is lost, there is the De .
When the De is lost, there is the virtue of human-heartedness.
When human-heartedness is lost there is the virtue of righteousness.
When righteousness is lost, there are the ceremonials.
These are the degeneration of loyalty and good faith and the beginning of Disorder."

This represents the philosophical divergence of the two philosophies of which each belief system contrasted the other in terms of the role of government (e.g. Confucius supported a progressive Emperor; Lao Zi encouraged the Emperor to limit government and disengage the effects of civilization.)

While such a belief system as that of Lao Zi may be suitable for individuals, it is not an advantageous pursuit for a collective society. It was not until Chuang Zi restructured Lao Zi's concepts using obscure paradoxes and vague riddles displaying the logical contradictions evident in daily life and language that succession occurred, thereby justifying the possible role of Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) for everyday society. Unlike the social philosophical nature of Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours), Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) addresses metaphysical problems, a philosophy native to China that seeks to explain the origins and processes of the universe.


Were there periods in Chinese history that can be labeled as "Confucian period" or "Daoist period"?

Beginning with the reign of the Han Dynasty, which lasted for 400 years, China officially became a Confucian state. It was during this period that China began to prosper. Agriculture, handicrafts, and commerce increased dramatically and the population reached 50 million. During the period of Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours), often referenced as "Han Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours)," Confucian philosophers of the Han dynasty connected a system of thought incorporating the yin-yang cosmology of the naturalists, Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours)'s concern for harmonizing with the order of nature, Confucian teachings on benevolent government, rule by virtuous leaders, and respect for learning, and Legalist principles of administration and economic development. Han Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) was officially utilized by the government around 136 BC, making it the required learning for government service.
When the Han Dynasty began to fall (during the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD), a lack of philosophical leading and followers led to the eventual collapse of Han Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours). As Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) collapsed, Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) strongly emerged in China changing from being the philosophy of a small number of sages to a prevalent religion followed by numerous individual believers and by many groups including monks. This change lasted until around the 14th century with the modification of original ideas and the addition of new elements.
With each dynasty came a transition period concerning the religious and philosophical thinking of each period. A brief inclusion of specific dynasties and periods follow with direct attention to the religions of each era.

Pre-Imperial (Feudal) Period (ended around 222 BC) - It was under the reign of the Zhou dynasty that most of the Confucian Canon was introduced.

Early Imperial period (221 BC – 220 AD) - Under the rule of the Qin dynasty, Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) was emerging stronger. During the reign of the Han dynasty (206 BC - AD 220), the longest of all reigning dynastic periods, Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) emerged as the primary theory of governing as a canon was produced from memory of earlier Confucian texts.

During the first Intermediate period (220 – 581 AD), the breakdown of the Han dynasty began and the period saw the rise of Neo-Taoism. Many historians believe the interest in Neo-Taoism was due to the intense disappointment at the failure of Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) to prevent the Han from falling apart.

Middle Imperial Period (581-907 AD) - Institutionalized Buddhism became tremendously important but declined after the great persecution of 845 AD.

Second Intermediate Era (907-979 AD)
Third Imperial Era (960-1367 AD) – The Song dynasty reigned and several writers emerged as Neo-Confucians. It was these writers' reinterpretations of the Confucian Canon that lead to the reintroduction of Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) as the state orthodoxy for the evaluation of entries in civil service exams.
Modern Era (1368 AD to present) – This period was first ruled by the Ming dynasty which promoted further refinement of Neo-Confucian thinking. It was under the rule of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) that the Catholic rites controversy forced missionaries to condemn ancestor worship.


Five Major Dynasties and Their Founders in Chinese History:

Focus within this section is on the Hsin, Song, Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006), Qin, and Zhou Dynasties, including their founders and the distinctive features of these dynasties.

In 9 AD, Wang Mang founded what would become the short-lived Hsin Dynasty. Mang introduced extensive reforms that included breaking up large estates and freeing of slaves of which the latter was met with great opposition. As a result of open disagreement with the freeing of slaves, Mang ultimately ordered slaveholders to pay a special tax instead of releasing slaves. It was shortly after Mang instituted a series of price controls on staples that his opponents set out in revolt against him during which he was killed in 23 AD.

The Zhou dynasty was founded and first ruled by Wuwang around 11 BC. Wuwang, with the assistance of his brother, Zhougong, merged his rule through the establishment of a feudalistic type of government in which territory was given to relatives and vassals who acknowledged Zhou a sovereign. The Zhou dynasty lasted longer than any other in the history of China. It was during this period that the use of iron was introduced, as was the introduction of the written script, which evolved from the ancient stage to the beginnings of the modern stage.

Following the Zhou dynasty was the Qin Dynasty (221 BC - 206 BC) was preceded by the Zhou Dynasty under the rule of the First Emperor Qin Shi Huangdi. The unification of China under the rule of Qin marked the foundation of imperial China, a period that lasted until the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. The Qin Dynasty marked what would later become a legacy of a centralized and bureaucratic state carried throughout successive dynasties.
Founded by Kublai Khan, the Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006) dynasty held its place from 1271–1368 AD as a Mongol dynasty. Khan encouraged and implemented strength and growing contact with the West, while strongly discouraging Confucian ideals. The onset and continuance of revolts in Mongolia and South China led to the end of this dynasty. The Song Dynasty, a ruling dynasty in China from 960-1279, was founded by Zhao Kuangyin (Taizu) built on successful national bureaucracy staffed with civilian scholar-officials.
Regional military governors and their supporters were quickly replaced by centrally appointed officials, of which this new system of civilian rule led to a greater concentration of power in the emperor and his palace bureaucracy than had been achieved in the previous dynasties. It was under the rule of this dynasty that China's economy grew strong in the areas of trade, industry, and maritime commerce. The development of paper money and a unified tax system resulted in the development of a progressive nationwide market system, marking the reunification of China for the first time since the fall of the Tang dynasty.

A number of factors contributed to the Chinese pattern of dynastic cycle. One factor is the long periods of political unity (Han, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties each govern for 250-300 years) are met with periods of political disunity, which results in disorganization and a desperate need for something new to bring China back to some form of unity. Additional factors include an evident pattern of territorial pressure and incursions from North China's nomadic groups, who are attracted by the wealth of the settled, agricultural civilization of China [e.g. Mongols conquer China and establish the Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006) dynasty (1279-1368 CE), Manchus conquer China and establish the Qing dynasty (1644-1911 CE)].

Obvious patterns of cultural continuity in terms of bureaucratic structure result in China's continued desire for progressive political unification and reunification. It is this pattern of dynastic formation, ascendance, and eventual decline that makes up the dynastic cycle. Overall, politics is the leading factor in the pattern of China's dynastic cycle.


A turning point in Chinese History:

The major turning point in the history of China can be clearly attributed to the first Emperor, Chin Shi Huang, whose ruthless ambition led to china’s progression. In fact, he has been called "the man who made China." Chin was a warrior king and brutal tyrant who achieved his overwhelming power by destroying all who opposed his rule and the Qin dynasty. He survived multiple assassination attempts. Chin was a clear leader, commanding millions, uniting China, and building the Great Wall of China (Ebrey 196,230,236) (Travel China Guide).

Chin's part in building the Great Wall came after the Zhou dynasty began plans for the wall, primarily to serve as a military defense against intrusion by tribes on the borders. During the Spring and Autumn Period (770 BC - 476 BC), states extended the defense work and built "great" structures to prevent the attacks from other states. However, it was not until Chin's rule of the Qin Dynasty that the separate walls, constructed by the states of Qin, Yan and Zhao kingdoms, were connected to form a defensive system on the northern border of the country. After unifying China (214 BC), Chin ordered the construction of the wall, which tool about ten years to finish, stretching from Linzhao in the west to Liaodong in the east. The Wall served as a defense in the north and marked the extensive power of Chin as emperor (Jordan 1996).

Chin’s power, evident in building the Great Wall, has been carried throughout China's history. Present remains of the Great Wall in Beijing are mainly from the Ming Dynasty period (1368 -1644) during which time the Wall was used to strengthen the military control of the northern frontiers. Ming authorities divided the Great Wall into nine zones and placed each under the control of a Zhen (a defense force command center) (Ebrey 236, 242-3) (Jordan 1996).

The reign of the Ming was a turning point in itself as the dynasty was in force from 1368-1645 AD. Extreme violence came with the Ming, as well. Within the universe of armed uprisings in the Ming, three subtypes can be distinguished. First, dynastic contenders manifested dynastic ambitions or proclaimed sovereignty by one or more of the following actions: declaring the founding of a new dynasty; claiming the title of emperor or king for the leader or official titles for his entourage; establishing a bureaucracy or inaugurating civil examinations to recruit new officials; renaming localities under their control; and adopting symbols of sovereign rule -- government seals, new coats of arms, flags, or new issues of currency. Second, military challengers launched a military offensive against the state, by attacking seats of county, prefectural, or provincial government; assaulting military garrisons or police checkpoints; raiding county or prefectural treasuries; or releasing county prison inmates; they stopped short, however, of manifesting dynastic ambitions or proclaiming sovereignty. Third, in armed disturbances, armed predatory groups pillaged villages, raided stores and provisions, robbed traveling merchants, or captured hostages for ransom.

There were distinct patterns of spatial and temporal distribution of collective violence in the Ming. In the whole period, a total of 630 rebellions and banditry events erupted in 538 counties in the 11 provinces and affected a total of 1,905 counties. Temporally, the second half of the dynasty was much more rebellious and bandit-ridden than the first half; this pattern was observed regardless of the different measures, regional groupings, or levels of aggregation used. In terms of reigns, the administrations of Emperors Wuzong (1506-21), Shizong (1522-66), Xizong (1621-27), and Sizong (1628-44) were the most strife-ridden, and those of Emperors Huizong (1399-1402), Chengzu (1403-24), Xuanzong (1426-35), and Daizong (1450-56) were the most peaceful (Jordan 1996).

Spatially, the six southern provinces were marred by more strife than the five northern provinces; the dominance of the south persists even when time periods and levels of aggregation are controlled. At the provincial level, the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian were the most defiant, and the two northern provinces of Henan and Shanxi were the most compliant. With respect to the sociopolitical profile, several major groupings of predatory bandits, non-predatory groups, and commoners turned outlaws can be distinguished.

Dividing the entire Ming dynasty (277 years) into two halves, the first 138 years (1368-1505) comprise exactly the first ten reigns (from Emperor Taizu to Emperor Xiaozong) and the second 139 years (1506-1644) the last seven reigns (from Emperor Wuzong to Emperor Sizong). It is in the second half of the dynasty that four-fifths of the total number of violent events occurred. However, there actually three peaks of collective violence in the Ming dynasty that occurred in the second half (Jordan 1996).

The first peak emerged in the middle of the dynasty, during the reign of Emperor Wuzong (1506-21). The number of uprisings shot up from 10 or less in the preceding three decades to 33 in 1506-1515, peaked at 48 in the following decade (1516-25), and fell back to 29 in the following two decades (152645). In the mid-sixteenth century, during the last two decades of the reign of Emperor Shizong (1522-66), uprisings rose to 31 events in the decade starting in 1546, soared to the second peak of 83 events in the decade 1556-65, and fell to 52 in 1566-75 (Jordan 1996).

A period of relative peace and order followed: armed disturbances dropped to a new low of between 7 and 18 per decade for the following 50 years, a period that approximately coincided with the reign of Emperor Shenzong (1573-1619). The third and last peak emerged in the last two decades of the dynasty, during the reigns of Emperor Xizong (1621-27) and Sizong (1628-44), when the number of uprisings surged to 74 and 83 per decade, respectively, between 1626 and 1644, culminating in the fall of the dynasty in 1644, when the rebel Li Zicheng overran the imperial capital (Jordan 1996).

There were at least three major forms of collective violence in the Ming, of which includes revolts of commoners against imperial clansmen, tenants against landlords, and bondservants against their masters. These are distinct cases of collective violence in which antagonistic classes with asymmetric power relations are pitted against one another. Each case is a classic example of class conflict in the Ming.

Marxist historians in China have often portrayed the imperial clansmen (zongshi) as a prime example of the exploitative class in the Ming. Vested with economic privileges and political power, they were the most parasitic class in the empire and provoked collective violence in two principal ways. Through personal abuses and an oppressive manorial system, they tyrannized commoners working on or near their estates. More cunningly, their emoluments and land grants drained the imperial treasury, increased the tax burden on the commoners, and cut into peasant landholdings. The explosion of this class multiplied the impact of these baneful effects until the end of the dynasty, when widespread uprisings destroyed all princely estates and virtually exterminated the imperial clan in 1644.
Each member of the Ming imperial clan received a land grant and an emolument. The size of the emolument depended on their position in the imperial family tree, sex, and age. For instance, those of the highest order - imperial princes (qinwang) - were given 10,000 shi (approximately 500 metric tons) of rice annually. Those of the 14th and lowest rank, xiangiun and yibin, the fourth-generation female descendants of lesser princes and their husbands, received 200 shi (10 tons). In comparison, a cabinet minister received 732 shi, a provincial governor 576 shi, and a county magistrate 90 shi. In addition, each imperial clansman also received a cash stipend, in varying amounts.

To compound the problem, not only did imperial clansmen receive huge emoluments, they were also given large land grants. During the early Ming, they received only small estates or none at all. For instance, when Taizu conferred the title of wang (king) on nine of his sons in 1370, he did not give them any land. Later on he awarded them modest grants - of uncultivated land. In other words, like the emoluments, land grants were not a serious problem during the early Ming. In the latter half of the dynasty, however, the problem reached alarming proportions.

The size of princely estates increased in direct proportion to the number of clansmen, which doubled every 30 years or so. But even more seriously, later emperors gave away large tracts of good farmland to their favorite sons and grandsons. Emperor Shenzong (1573-1620) wanted to endow his favorite son, Prince Fu, with 40, 000 qing (136 sq. miles) of rich farmland in Henan. Emperor Xizong (1621-27) conferred a total of 90,000 qing on his three sons in 1623. Elsewhere, Prince Chong had at least 7,000 qing in Henan, and Prince De's estates in Puzhou alone covered 3,000 qing. The result was an increasing concentration of land in princely estates.

Extravagant emoluments and land grants were only part of the Ming founder's general scheme to consolidate the power of the imperial family by bestowing asymmetric wealth, status, and power on the imperial clan in relation to the bureaucracy and civilian population. A prince of the first degree received more than 13 times the emolument of a cabinet minister, and the lowest-ranking imperial clansman's emolument was twice that of a county magistrate. The contrast in wealth would be much greater if we included the cash stipend that the imperial clansmen also received, as well as state expenditures on construction, repair, and maintenance of palaces and estates; on birthdays, weddings, and funerals, and on salaries for custodial, security, clerical, and ceremonial staffs. These expenses were staggering.

Aside from wealth, the imperial clansmen also had higher political status. The Bureau of Imperial Clansmen (Zongrenfu), is the first government agency listed in the section on government organizations in the Ming huiyao, Daming huidian, and Huangming zhishu, all official imperial government publications. The head, deputy heads, and assistants to deputy heads of the agency were two ranks above, and received a salary that was 50 percent higher, than the chief ministers of the six Ministries.

Each princely estate also had its own bureaucracy and service agencies. The head cook, head tailor, head gatekeeper, and jewelry curator were ranked two degrees above a county magistrate, and their salaries were a third higher. Even their deputies had higher official ranks and received higher salaries than county magistrates. In addition, as blood relatives of the emperor, imperial clansmen could command respect from bureaucrats, servants of the throne. All top-ranking officials where the princes held residence, including the provincial governor and the provincial military commander, were required by law to pay courtesy calls and kowtow on the first and fifteenth days of each month. Likewise, all imperial emissaries and other officials passing near a prince's residence had to pay courtesy calls and perform the quadruple-bow ceremony.

Vested with such powers and privileges, many imperial clansmen were above the law. Dai Xuan, a military commander in Nanchang, made the fatal mistake of calling on Prince Ning too late and bringing a gift too modest. The prince had him beaten to death, confiscated his property, imprisoned his son, and gave away his daughter as a concubine. Although these examples serve to illustrate the abusive behavior of Ming princes, they were probably rare and extreme cases. More pervasive was the high rent structure of princely estates, which was more oppressive than that on private or government land in several respects.


Most distinctive feature of Chinese civilization

Of all features that could be discussed, the most distinctive is China's religious history. Of all major world ancient civilizations, Chinese civilization is the only one that remains uninterrupted by an alien culture. China's religions (primarily Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours), Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours), and Buddhism) took pride in being patriotic. All Chinese religions included a belief system that encouraged its government and people to put the country's interest first, with harmony and peace as the forefront of each religion (Chinese Embassy).

Looking back over the history of China, we know it was once reduced to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society at which times China's religions maintained a patriarchal nature. Although many modern civilizations frown upon the male dominance role, China's holding to its patriarchal nature proves its strong dedication to its principle and traditions. Changes in this realm did occur, however, and include the transformation of the patriarchal-feudal character, indicating that China's patriarchal clan system that was based on blood lineage in both political and social realms has subsided. The transformation provided strength to China’s government on political and institutional levels while also setting the stage to preserve the rites and customs in social relations.
It was a result of these changes that the Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours)-centered Chinese culture emerged and other Chinese religions [Daoism and Buddhism] (Ibid.) influenced one another. It was the adoption of parts of each religion that strengthened the religion of China through the people’s belief in honoring the heaven, the ancestor and the country, stressing the preservation of the present world and adapting to it rationally. Although there were some other religious beliefs throughout Chinese history, one premise remained constant: incoming religions were only allowed if they agreed to adapt to the Chinese tradition of honor, preservation, and harmony.

As most recognize, China's three main religions were/are Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours), Daoism (IEP) (Imperial Tours) and Buddhism. However, Christianity (Ebrey 8, 22, 825-6) did make its entry into China, although not taking full form as did the main three religions. It was during the period of the Qing dynasty that Christianity (Ebrey 8, 22, 825-6) emerged. Great controversy broke out concerning various rites, resulting in the Catholic Pope forbidding Chinese Catholics to honor Confucius and ancestors. This action led to 100 years of Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) being banned as a religion in China. Nevertheless, Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) emerged once again, remaining one of the major religions in the Asian culture today.

Although not a religion per se, the fundamental features of Chinese society under Communism are suggestive of China's imperial history. The similarities of the present regime and some of the earlier dynasties are remarkable. Undeniably, the leadership of the Chinese Communist party, represented by its Central Committee and headed by Mao Tse-tung, holds as much –if not more- power and is as autocratic in its behavior as its imperial predecessors (Jordan 1996).

The ideology of Communism replaced Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) and harbors less divergence and tolerates no opposition. The time when mastery of the Confucian classics and passage of examinations once constituted the major avenue of social advancement, the Chinese government today views its power and prestige as a direct result from personal identification with the party and adherence to its ideology.


Unique characteristics of the ruling class in Chinese history

The greatest of all characteristics concerning the ruling class in China's history is the inclusion of philosophy that incorporates a strong bureaucratic system. It is this characteristic that enabled the centralized Chinese Empire to thrive for so long (Jordan 1996). Each ruling class brought its own ideas, but a constant remaining foundation based on the importance of philosophy was paramount.

Each dynasty added or retracted from previous philosophies, but the underlying meaning remained he same: China was determined to be independent, to flourish in physical and political and general terms, as its law and philosophy went hand in hand. According to historians, China's fiscal organization under the Ming dynasty, partly reflecting the calculated design of the dynastic founder, left no room for such philosophical thinking.
Many changes did take place during the five centuries following the founding of the Ming dynasty and by the sixteenth century, the use of silver for tax payments led to the consolidation of some of the accounts that hindered the state's progression. With the change of dynasty, the Manchus introduced a number of reforms including the regularization of the collection of melting charges on silver payments ordered by the Yongzheng Emperor. Prototype banks, managed by Shansi merchants, later became prominent (post-1800). On into the nineteenth century, the treaty system was confirmed and new revenues (e.g. maritime tariffs) began to replace the traditional finances. It was the progression of capitalism that marked the onset of new commercial laws to the Chinese population. Under the new laws, not only family relations and inheritance must be bound by modern usage, but also matters of fraud and deceit, embezzlement, mortgage, and bankruptcy, among other matters, were to be treated in accordance with mercantile practice. Defying the new capitalist laws would place a barrier between the lower level infrastructure thereby deterring the potential for advancement of business empires and networks.

China under the Ming and Qing had no desire and lacked the capability of taking such a plunge. There was too wide a distance between a society governed by patriarchal power and one based on property rights that had been a result of municipal franchise. However, the dynastic strength of the early Ming and Qing stemmed mainly from the immaturity of these new laws. It was the lack of continual and renewed economic maintenance that led to both the Ming and Qing's eventual decline.

In a broad and general sense, state institutions of the Ming and Qing could not make the dynasties adaptable to modern technology. In the Western experience, science and technology thrive on a robust economy which makes a great extent of division of labor possible, and which encourages regional specialization. In sum, the society as a whole takes advantage of natural imbalance and reaps benefits from the mutual competition of those diversified elements until they complement one another, even though in the process another state of imbalance on a higher level emerges. The key to the success is incessant activity. Against this trend, Ming and Qing society can be said to have been organized by a magnificent peasant who was obsessed with the traditional concept of equilibrium at the lowest level. The maneuver created an artificial balance beforehand.

The dynastic founder, Zhao Kuangyin, being an army general, ascended the throne as a result of a coup engineered by his subordinates. He and his dynasty seemed to have the potential to endow China with a new outlook. The national capital was settled at Kaifeng, a commercial capital. Refraining from land reorganization as the basis of structuring the new dynasty, the Song promoted commerce, making headway in constructing ships, minting money, opening mines, collecting commercial taxes, and installing government monopolies. Military manpower was procured through recruitment instead of conscription, continuing a trend established during the Five Dynasties.

It was during the reign of the Song Dynasty that projected the advanced sectors of the national economy as the basis of its monetary management; however, bottom structures of the village communities could not coincide. The ensuing bureaucratic practice led to fabrication of information in horrendous proportions. While seemingly elementary, the distribution of food was also met with its own complications.

During the period of the new laws, there were nine methods by which the government could compulsorily purchase food from the population. In an official document, Sima Guang disclosed that troops numbering several hundred thousand could be phantom figures. This state of affairs continued during the Southern Song period. By then, the accounts handled by the district financial officers, referred to as jing zhi qian and ban zhang qian, appeared neither as a budget nor as a cash ledger. It was unclear whether tax collection should follow fixed rates or be assigned to farmers in lump sums. The issue of negotiable notes, devoid of effective auditing, caused extreme currency inflation. In contrast, the less developed states in the North that was in contest with the Song, leaning on their crude economy and seemingly more backward methods, fared better in delivering the needed personnel and equipment to the battlefields.

When the Mongol Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006) Dynasty took over, it found no solution to bridge the gap. A formula was reached by separating the administration of the North from that of the South. Drastic tax reductions were authorized to encourage public support, although the policy was hardly substantiated. Failure to develop a workable system was a major reason for the political instability under the Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006).

The founding of the Ming in 1368 marked a massive step backward in Chinese history. The extrovert character of the Tang and Song was replaced by a mood of coyness. The competitive position of the two previous eras gave way to a noncompetitive outlook. Zhu Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006)zhang, the dynastic founder, at one time unambiguously declared that Shenzong of the Song had commissioned Wang Anshi to handle financial affairs of which he warned should be viewed as a monition. Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006)zhang's instructions to the Ministry of Revenue labeled Sang Hongyang of the Han and Yang Yan of the Tang two able administrators who had widened state revenue by introducing commercial practices to their offices, as immoral opportunists. This conservative approach to economy, with a long historical standing, was put into practice by deeds.

During his reign by deceptive ploys, Zhu Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006)zhang seized the opportunity of four criminal cases ranging from treason and larceny to falsify fiscal records in order to persecute his own bureaucrats and the regional and local officials. According to the Monograph on Penalty of the Ming shi, "most households of the middle class and above were ruined." In 1397, there were still 14,341 households across the empire that owned 700 mou of land (approximately 120 acres) or more. A list of them was presented to the sovereign himself. Under decrees of the dynastic founder, the following regulations were enacted:
Merchants and their family members were not allowed to wear silk.
All imperial subjects were forbidden to take to the sea.
The entire troop of office clerks, runners, and attendants was drafted from the population and remained unpaid.
Utensils and stationery for public use, along with bows and arrows, were requisitioned from village communities.
To protect the farming population from the disturbance of mobilization, a system of hereditary military households was organized, to follow a similar institution of the Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006).
The dynasty proscribed the use of precious metals in business transactions, yet it refrained from minting bronze coins.
When the paper currency printed in quantity fell into disuse, there was a shortage of money.
While government functionaries of the Tang and Song engaged in manufacturing and transit of goods, the Ministry of Revenue of the Ming remained nothing more than a large accounting office (Wikipedia June 2006; Jordan 1996) .

Learning from the lesson of the Qin's quick downfall among other controversial dynastic leaders, the Han allowed itself a mixed constitution, which made the territories of the appointed prefects adjacent to the domains of the princes and marquises and tightened the proclaimed Confucian humanism with the Legalist stringency. It survived the coup of the family of the first empress and experienced the gentle rule of the third and fourth emperors. It was under the reign of Wudi was the policy of centralism reaffirmed, but that was only after the dynasty had been in place for more than sixty years.

Wudi reigned for fifty-four years (141-87 B.C.), during which time he waged Xiongnu wars eight times and sent expeditions to Koko Nor and Vietnam. Historian Sima Qian claimed that his military supplies acquired more than ten zhong to deliver one hundredweight.

Understanding that each zhong was 6.4 hundredweight, less than two percent of material collected on the home front was eventually to be delivered to the field. While historians are unsure of the precision in the fact of the obvious deceit, there is little doubt that the mobilization was both intensive and extensive, a fact that was further substantiated by the number of grand councilors and imperial secretaries who were either imprisoned by the emperor or committed suicide. The Han lost the First Empire because this condition was compromised; however, the Sui helped to create the Second Empire by restoring it.

The dynastic founder's son, Yang Guang, initiated construction on a grand scale and fought a winless war in Korea. He exhausted the nation and made the Sui merely a pacesetter for the Tang, similar to the way in which the Qin had paved the road for the Han. Yet, after taking into consideration the events before and after, including the unifier Yang Jian's cruelty, and the equally cruel performance of the enlightened ruler of the Tang, Li Shimin, who extended the butchery to his own brothers and nephews, we may have to acknowledge that to construct a huge empire at a time when technology was not ready to give support and public education was at a minimum, there was probably no better way than to throw the peasant masses into a gigantic movement and keep the momentum going and resist interference of any kind, ruthlessly, by all means.

The Tang dynasty lasted for close to three hundred years (618-906), which appeared to be a brilliant era in Chinese history. It enjoyed a benefit unknown to other dynasties. After the long period of struggle, the obstacles to integration had one after another been eliminated by the minor dynasties preceding it. With the number of dynasties and the formations of each, indications point to the profound influence geopolitics had on Chinese history.

Unless we lift the horizon of our vision, we cannot explain the puzzling factors of the recurring political centralism, the need to anticipate wartime organization in time of peace, and the undue value placed on quantity rather than quality. Once those elements are understood, we can say that the development of Chinese history from the B.C. era to the present time has been persistent. Its linear progression overrules the dynastic cycles, which are no more than internal fluctuations.

Leaning toward religion, Chinese bureaucracy took an idealist approach to practical problems. When obstacles arose from its own impracticality, often it avoided the real issue. Instead, it claimed that yong (function, or modus operandi) was supposed to differ from ti (body, or prototype). In this way it connived in the noncompliance with the law.
From the standpoint of macro history, the exploitation of the population by the ruling class was not the center of the problem. When the mass of small self-cultivators was set up as its fiscal foundation, the bureaucracy did not include a potential warrior group or nobility from becoming its middle-echelon apparatus, nor would it permit mercantile interests to act as its agents. In this way, no machinery for systematic exploitation was put in place. The civil service examinations, in the effort to recruit talent, created sufficient social mobility to prevent permanent exploitation. Looking from the angle of developing a national economy, the problem existed on the other side. It was that the accumulated wealth was unable to take hold.


How was the ruling class dominance in Chinese society institutionalized?

As dynasties fell and new rulers took the reigns of governing China, varied types of governments were introduced. Dissecting the dominance of the ruling class is a complex process, especially when there is such strong reliance on commodities where such capitalist classes mark their dominance in economic terms. This dominance leads to the subordination of other classes that, in turn, leads to a decline in economic relations. The ruling class in Chinese society was institutionalized through economic dominance, which must be maintained and backed by political power.

The ruling class throughout China's history was successful in maintaining a dominant position thereby affecting the increase of inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income. With each dynasty came specific obstacles, one of which was opposition to their dominance and their capacity to rule. The result was most often seen in economic affects (economic recession, increased inequality, high ratios of unemployment, increased poverty, and larger social divisions). China's ruling class, through its history, devised plan after plan to obtain and maintain dominance often backed by state and party power forces (political elites).

The Manchu takeover, however, fundamentally featured disciplinary and technical touches only; they were not institutional or organizational renewals. Under the Qing, the positions of ministers and vice-ministers were doubled to accommodate Chinese and Manchu officeholders in equal number. At the direction of Kangxi, the quota of the ding, or able-bodied males, was permanently frozen as of the record of 1711, which made it possible later to merge the poll tax and the land tax.

The Yongzhen Emperor ordered that the collection of melting charges on payments made in silver be institutionalized, the proceeds being distributed as supplementary salary to officials in charge to nourish their honesty. He also organized the Grand Council, with a handful of top bureaucrats who could meet the sovereign regularly, so that matters requiring the attention of the throne could be dispatched speedily. These several items exhausted the list of major institutional innovations of the Qing.

The new dynasty, with a larger population, an extended territory, and a higher level of production, could not separate itself substantially from the pattern established by its predecessor. The same four books and five classics provided the spiritual guidance to its bureaucracy. The same set of principles, stressing status, sex, and age differentiation, tightened its social order. The civil service examinations continued to function as an institutional link between the governing and the governed. For literati-lords turned warlords, the sequence of events established a world record that has yet to be broken. It also reveals that the private interests of the individual must be given adequate outlets for fulfillment. If constantly suppressed as if water were unchecked by earth against its natural direction of flow, a breakaway could do more serious damage.

Classical education and a status called "filial pious and incorruptible" could all be turned, into instruments of self-gain and equipment to enter the battlefield. Visualizing the pitfalls, centuries later the Sui abandoned the nomination and recommendation system of the Han but institutionalized the open examination system for recruiting its functionaries.

Yang Yan's "two-tax system," proclaimed in 780, never openly nullified the zu-yong-tiao. But the latter, along with the land allotment plan, was in fact shelved. Nor did Yang's innovation constitute a system. Its net effect was a tacit authorization for the provincial officials to collect taxes as they saw fit, so that portions of the proceeds could be delivered to the capital. However, the amount delivered counted no more than two or three out of ten. Political centralism of course had no place under those conditions. When the trend carried, the regional military posts became inheritable. It went on until the Five Dynasties period, when it was the norm that everywhere army officers took charge. Taxation fell entirely into the hands of provincial strongmen.

The Five Dynasties, altogether occupying a span of only fifty-four years (906-960), is not to be compared with Wei-Jin and the North and South Court period. Without an effective central government dictating what could be done and what could not, regional economy, following its own impulse, made robust advances. Throughout China's imperial period, tax legislation had never before been decided on the regional level yet formally institutionalized.

Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party worked for the renewal of the nation's bottom structure. The land reform and the rural reorganization provided this horizontal stroke at the bottom of the character. Only a social structure based on a system of commercial principles can render all its components mathematically manageable. While everything within this organic body becomes institutionalized, China will be modernized as a result.

Contrary to the religious contributions in Chinese history is the warlord politics that came from a wide range of venues. For example, even during one of the most dramatic and apparently politically inspired periods of modern Chinese politics, the Cultural Revolution, when students and Red Guards seemed to be in aggressive command and when the structure of the party was being torn apart, it was the People's Liberation Army that was in fact becoming the vital institution of rule; Mao's rhetoric was of revolution, but his decisions, as with all modern Chinese political leaders, tended to give operational power to the army.

Although the same basic problems of structure and attitude are to be found in both the Nationalist and Communist periods, they are in many respects best studied during the warlord period. An analysis of the nature of warlord institutions and the logic of their power relationships may be of great importance in providing us with a better understanding of the upheaval of the Chinese polity since the collapse of the imperial system, and it can point to the underlying power dynamics of the subsequent Nationalist and Communist periods, during which the military continued to be the ultimate institution of Chinese politics.

The warlord period as an interregnum was generally interpreted as qualified by the Western impact upon Chinese society — a new ingredient not present during the other periods of turmoil between dynasties. There was now the demand that China practice some form of republican government and constitutional rule. The warlord era could thus be interpreted as a period when, although the symbols and slogans of republicanism were recognized as essential, the population as a whole was not qualified to contribute to the success of such a government. China had only partially and imperfectly assimilated the Western ideals of constitutional government and was therefore unable either to institute a workable republican government or to return to the old system of traditional rule.

These theories, although possibly valid as far as they went, do not adequately explain the phenomenon of warlordism in terms that make meaningful either the complex relationship of the participants or the relation of this period to the previous system of social organization or to the later Nationalist and Communist eras. It is necessary to consider the period in terms of the process of cultural change in which one can distinguish elements of continuity from the previous period as well as elements of discontinuity.

The movement was away from a society that had been highly systematized and toward a condition of greater cultural heterogeneity. Various aspects of Chinese society had been subject to differing degrees of transformation. Thus, the failure of the republican system to function rested upon far more critical factors than just the lack of appreciation for, and understanding of, constitutional and democratic values. The institutions and ordering of the total society were not oriented to the support of such a system of government.
If we are to view warlordism as an aspect of the Chinese process of modernization and political development, we must at the outset note some of the basic features of traditional China. What is called for is not a detailed analysis of a great civilization but rather a general characterization of the traditional order that identifies its more salient features. In particular, we need to note the manner in which power was once organized, the basis of the political and social order, and the immediate consequences of the collapse of that order.

The traditional Chinese social order was striking in the relative simplicity of its form. At the top of both the governmental and social structures were the Emperor and his immediate advisers. At the bottom of the order were the great masses of the people. The society, being agrarian in nature, was highly sedentary, with an economic order that was both extremely simple and relatively stable. This gave to the great bulk of the members of the society a uniform outlook on life and a minimum of conflict over basic values.
The pattern of values was fully recognized by the people and served as a positive framework by which they regulated their behavior. The problems that arose were met with traditional answers, and there was little need for governmental organizations to regulate the actions of the masses. What conflicts of interests did develop was usually solved if possible through informal means. Thus, government in the formal sense was not a primary concern of the people.

The social and political core of traditional China was the body of literati who functioned through the bureaucratic organization of formal government. This was the key element that gave to traditional China its distinctive political and social life. Members of this group were the carriers of the higher social values of the society, and they established and propagated the idealized patterns of social behavior.

The literati recognized Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) as a formal and valid scheme of general values that were compatible with and reinforced by the general conditions of the agrarian society. The importance placed upon knowledge of a script and the necessity of acting through a bureaucracy did lead to a strikingly rational orientation of much of the behavior of the literati. However, this rational approach proceeded from the acceptance of traditional values and did not develop into "critical rationalism," whereby the traditional values would have been subjected to attack.
Bureaucracy, in addition to being the bulwark of the government, represented the single arena within which individuals competed to achieve the highest social and political prestige and honors offered by the society. Social prestige, economic security, and political power were all to be realized by entering this field of endeavor. Whatever the particular personal aims of the individual, the greatest opportunity for realizing them was to be found in complying with the same general pattern of behavior as would be followed to achieve other, and what in different cultures would seem to be unrelated, aims. The consequence of this situation was the existence of what may be described as a highly monolithic social and state structure.

This monolithic state structure produced a distinctive type of political life. There was a striking paucity of organized associations, parties, or pressure groups competing for political power in order to achieve particular objectives. The trade and craft guilds, secret religious societies, provincial clubs, and clan organizations did serve as informal organs of political control. However, their objectives were of a limited nature and did not include the demand for control of the formal organs of government or for the direction of government policy. These groups directed their energies toward receiving favors from, rather than securing the direction of, the official hierarchy (Ebrey 9, 14-5) and became critical factors during periods when the structure of government had collapsed.
Rather than interest-group politics, there was a high incidence of personal competition, or "palace politics." Thus, in the formation of cliques, the important factors were personalities, friendships, and family relationships and not general principles and values. The existence of a bureaucracy with departments serving particular functions did not, as might be expected, lead to a high degree of competition among offices, bureaus, boards, and departments.


Roles of the elite throughout Chinese history

From the beginning of the first Chinese dynasty through the present People's Republic of China (PRC) the political elite have significant influence on the framework of China's government. Those persons and groups classed as the "elite" in China has a ruling vote in the regulations of the land, including reforms, rulers, et al. A prime example can be seen through the Maoist period, whereby terror campaigns and elimination was on the forefront of maintaining compliance with political realms. Rulers were under constant pressure to build and increase consensus for new policies among party members, local and regional leaders, influential non-party members, and the collective population. Additional levels of power in the political elite class came [and continues to come] from the control of information (limited information and/or propaganda and censorship).

Chinese society, permeated by a philosophical outlook that was humanistic, secular, rational, practical in tone, and conservative in spirit, was an open society without a hereditary privileged class. The leadership role in the society and the administrative functions of the government were assumed by an elite recruited through a civil service examination in which excellence in Confucian scholarship was the criterion. These examinations, which in theory and generally in practice were open to everyone, had stimulated considerable social mobility. Success in the examinations could bring a man, even of humble origin, legally privileged status, social prestige, access to a career in officialdom, and the means of acquiring wealth.

Each venue of the elite in Chinese history brought its own privileges and complications. The elite were also the higher class sect, political figures, dynastic leaders, and scholars.

Contributions of the elite in the making of Chinese culture and tradition
Chinese culture has always been admired and respected for its complexity and insights into human nature. Influence of the elite led to the way rulers governed their respective dynasties, which led to the levels of cultural advancements (or hindrances) we recognize in modern China. Advancements and preservations can be partially credited to Confucius; however, each of China's philosophers played a role the making of Chinese culture and tradition.

A great part of China's reputation rest in its long cultural and national history as China's people have shared a common culture longer than any other group in the world. Artists were also among some of the elite, also impacting China's culture with the introduction of the Chinese writing system. Additional contributions include the imperial dynastic system of government that continued for centuries.

In spite of the rise and fall of dynasties, the system itself survived. However, the system was overturned in 1911, replaced by the controversial and weak republican government that ended in 1949. Modern China is governed by a ruling Communist party and adheres to many of the same customs and traditions as set forth by its ancestors centuries ago.

China's culture and traditions are so strong, buried deep with the hearts of its people, that in spite of its conquering by foreign invaders [e.g. Mongols during the Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006) Dynasty (1279-1368 AD), Manchus during the Ch'ing Dynasty (644-1911 AD)] they sustained. In fact, the foreigners found themselves absorbed into the culture they governed. In spite of the introduction and decline of the dynastic cycle, the culture and power of China remains strong. China’s role in international economic and political affairs is a strong and importance position. This is due in part to its strong culture and traditions, and to the legacies each ruler left behind.

Another contribution worthy of expansion is the introduction of Chinese writing, of which the earliest examples date to the Shang period (ca. 1200 BC) and consist of the "Oracle Bone Inscriptions" (jiaguwen) found at the site of the last Shang capital near present-day Anyang, Henan province. Study of the bone's inscriptions indicates that Chinese writing was already a highly developed writing system used to record a language fairly similar to classical Chinese. Ancient Chinese diviners used these bones as records of their activity, leaving modern China and other nations with a detailed description what interested the Shang kings, of which most writings refer to hunting, warfare, weather, and selection of auspicious days for ceremonies, among others.

Bronze inscriptions followed that of bones and were widely used during the Eastern Zhou dynasty (ca. 1150-771 BC). However, some examples have come from the late Shang dynasty. Some of the inscriptions indicate they were written by the Chinese elite scholars as they are located on ritual vessels which were most often used for performing sacrifices. The written content indicates their use in ritual ceremonies and commemorations.

The beginning of what is now modern Chinese writing began around 5 BC. Most examples are found on bamboo strips. With this new form of writing comes new content, including historical and administrative writings. The bamboo strips contain the earliest manuscripts of famous Chinese philosophical texts (Laozi, Liji, and Lunyu). Other mediums for writing included wooden tablets and silk cloth.

The standardization of writing was onset by the First Emperor of Qin who unified China in 221 BC. Prior to Qin, each of the states in China had their own style and peculiarities. Although the scripts were generally comprehensible, each had its own deviations. The First Emperor introduced and implemented the Qin script as the official writing with the requirement that all the unified states must us it.

Another contribution by the Chinese elite is the affects Khan's rule in the Yuan (Ebrey 14-5, 73-76) (Wikipedia June 2006) dynasty had on Chinese culture and tradition. After developing the new Mongol capital of Khanbaliq and building the elaborate Forbidden City, Khan worked to improve China's agriculture thereby making it what modernist recognize as a thriving industry. Khan aided in relieving populace of taxes in times of hardship and distributed food among the poor. It was his initiative in building hospitals and orphanages that led China to become a more progressive nation. His promotion of both science and religion led to a strengthened nation and greater unity during his time, while leaving a legacy of progression evident in modern China.

While many perceive the Chinese elite to be mainly rulers, aristocrats and those of a higher religious sect, there are also scientific elites in Chinese history. Through the long-standing Chinese history, an individual's status is closely associated with a recognized family background and acquired individual education. In fact, during the process of intergenerational conversion, families also play a remarkable and resilient role, with the father's education imposing an influence on the education of his children. For example, if a man was afforded a quality education his son will also receive such a generous offering.

Chinese history indicates more importance was placed on an individual's educational achievement more than the father's occupational status. In fact, the stress on education as one of the important features of Confucianism (Ebrey 792-3, 850) (Imperial Tours) and family values of Chinese is a factor that has survived to modern China. While education in the historical sense is not what we recognize as education today (math, english, history, et al), but focused on the traditions of Chinese society. Tradition required those who wanted to become scholar-officials to master the Confucian classics and succeed in imperial civil service examinations (called keju kaoshi).

Posted by: Julia Vann

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